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NORTH DAKOTA LAW BEVIEV
were the rules liberally construed, with the exceptions gaining wide and varied
application, the result might be more equitable but it would bring about an
increase in the number of actions. " The theoretical difference between the
"liberal" interpretation and the "strict" or "literal" interpretation of the
rule against splitting causes of action lies in the definition of "cause of action";
whether it be a small group of operative facts to which the possible ex-
ceptions are numerous,'' or whether it be a large group of facts, which would
be all conclusive of the rights of the parties, barring most, if not all, subsequent
actions.2 1 Policy, as a result, controls the adjudication of actions which in-
volve this question and the Kentucky court has unequivocally allied itself
with the proposition that the rules are to be administered with due concern
for the plight of unwary and unfortunate litigants.
Louis R. MOORE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS - Is THE CON-
VEYANCE OF PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF A RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
BY A CA)-COvENANTOR AN ACTIONABLE BREACH OF CoVENANT?-Defendant con-
veyed her real estate to a non-Caucasian in violation of a written covenant,
which she had endorsed, providing that the property should not be occupied
by persons other than of the Caucasian race and that this restriction should
be contained in all papers transferring the stipulated land. Plaintiff asked
$11,600 damages for the breach of covenant. Held that to permit damages
would discourage the sale of restricted land to other than Caucasians except
at a premium to secure the seller for anticipated damages. This would den)'
non-Caucasians the right to buy property on the same terms as Caucasians
and would be a denial by the states of equsl protection of the laws. Barrows v.
Jackson, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953).
In his dissent Chief Justice Vinson listed the following points as the basis
for his disagreement:
1. The court has no jurisdiction since the party before the court is not
within the class of persons whose constitutional rights may be impaired., Al-
though it is the general rule that no person may question the constitutionality
of a statute who does not belong to the class of persons discriminated against,
the nile is not applicable to every case.2 When the constitutional rights of a
person or class of persons are to be determined by a federal court it must
determine them on the evidence presented.3 There is no definite rule that
will solve the question of Equal Protection of the Laws in every instance,
18. Sec Clark v. Kirby, 243 N.Y. 295, 153 N.E. 79, 82 (1926) "All procedure '§
merely a methodical means whereby the court reaches out to restore rights and remedy
wrongs; it must never become more important than the purpose which it seeks to
accomplish."
19. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Actions, 34 Yale L. J. 614 (1925).
20. Clark, Code Pleading, 137 (2d ed. 1947).
1. See Barrows v. Jackson, 73 S. Ct. 1031 (19.53) (dissent).
2. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021,
1023 (1920); Green v. State, 83 Neb. 84, 119 N.W. 6, 7 (1908); accord, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
3. Law v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346, 351 (D. Md. 1948).
RECENT CASES
but only general principles to guide the court in reaching a decision.4 An ex-
ception to the general rule stated above permits persons affected by the state
action to raise the constitutional question even though not a member of the
class discriminated against, if no member of that class is in a position to urge
its unconstitutionality.- This exception is applicable to the instant case where
a judgment adverse to the respondent would result in a direct injury of $11,600
to her."
2. Judgment for the plaintiff would invoke no direct injury to any identi-
fiable non-Caucasian and therefore the ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer is not
in point.7 The basic objective sought to be obtained by the framers of the
fourteenth amendment was the erasure of undue favor and hostile discrim-
ination and oppression of persons or classes, as well as the extension of federal
protection to the "recently emancipated race" from unfriendly action by the
states.8 As was pointed out in Shelly v. Kraemer, "Equality in the enjoyment
of property rights was regarded by the framers of that amendment as an
essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties
which the amendment was intended to guarantee". 9 The courts will not per-
mit a "quibbling distinction" to overturn a principle which has the protection
of a fundamental right as its aim.' 0 One of the general principles established
demands that the rights of all persons under similar circumstances be judged
by the same rules. This applies to all powers exercised by the state affecting
a class of people or their property." It is generally agreed that action by
the state courts constitutes action by the state, and it has been held that
covenants of this nature cannot therefore be enforced by judicial action of any
kind.1
3
3. The majority, in upholding the contentions of the respondent, imposed a
4. Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928); Magoun v. Illinois Trust
& Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898) "What satisfies this equality has not been
and probably never can be precisely defined."; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S.
321, 337 (1885) "The rule of equality, in respect to the subject, only requries the
same means and methods to be applied impartially to all the constituents of each class."
5. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021,
1023 (1920) (employer permitted to contest the constitutionality of a Workmen's Com-
pensation Act which permitted residents of California to proceed against the employer for
injuries sustained but which did not grant the privilege to non-residents, since no non-
resident could ever have the opportunity to raise the constitutional question); Green v.
Statk, 83 Neb. 84, 119 N.W. 6, 7 (1908) "Where such a law is sought to be enforced
against any person, whether belonging to the classes discriminated against or not, it
should be declared void." (Defendant's conviction of violating a statute which made
"blackmail" a crime only against citizens or residents of Nebraska reversed).
6. Barrows v. Jackson, 73 S. Ct. 1031 (1953).
7. See Barrows v. Jackson, 73 S. Ct. 1031 (1953) (dissent).
8. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78 (1917); accord, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 20 (1948); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 334 (1921).
9. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
10. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) (where repondent left a
package of narcotics in the room of another and officers entered and searched the room
without a warrant, held that an invasion of privacy was a good defense).
11. Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928); Magoun v. Illinois
Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898); Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115
U.S. 321, 337 (1885).
12. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution can only be impaired by
state action in the form of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings); Correll v.
Early, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1951).
13. Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D. D.C. 1950)
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"novel constitutional limitation" upon the state's power to enforce their con-
tracts. 14
According to construction by the courts in prior decisions this constitutional
limitation on the states to enforce their contracts .was imposed by the four-
teenth amendcment. ' The rule was laid down in Shelly v. Kraemer that the
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by the courts is state action in
violation oif tho cqual protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.,; This
nle is generally accepted by the courts and the decision in the instant case
which follows it is neither new nor novel.17 Any other would have effectively
nullified the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer and denied to the negroes the
protection from discrimination which the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment intended them to have.18
BAYARD LEwIs
CRIMINAL LAW - INDIANS - STATUTORY RAPE NOT A BASIS FOR JURISDIC-
TION UNDER TEN MAJOR CRIMES ACT - Defendant, a Menominee Indian, was
indicted by a federal grand jury for the statutory rape of an Indian girl on the
reservation. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the
federal court lacked jurisdiction to try him. It was held, that the motion
should be granted. The crime of rape enumerated in the Ten Major Crimes
Act, must be defined in accordance with the law of the state where the
crime is committed, and in Wisconsin, it does not include the carnal know-
ledge of a female under the age of consent. United States v. Jacobs, 113 F.Supp.
203 (E.D. Wis. 1953).
No federal court has jurisdiction to try an Indian for a criminal offense
committed on a reservation unless his crime is one covered by the so-called
Ten Major Crimes Act.2 The Act enumerates ten crimes considered offenses
if committed by one Indian against another on an Indian reservation. These
are murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault
with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery and larceny. Carnal know-
ledge, assault with intent to rape and assault with intent to do great bodily
harm were stricken from the Act as amended. Thus, these latter crimes are
no longer federal offenses with the meaning of the Act. In respect to the
crime of rape, the court will follow the law of the state where the crime was
committed.3 It is interesting to note, however, that as to the other crimes in
the Act, this is apparently not so, and the federal courts will disregard state
law and follow federal definitions or tribal law where they are concerned.
4
14. See Barrows v. Jackson, 73 S. Ct. 1013 (1953) (dissent).
15. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 (1948); Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp.
604 (D. D.C. 1950); see Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1951).
16. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 (1948).
17. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1. 17 (1948); Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp.
604 (D. D.C. 1950); cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
18. See the discussion in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (denying
negroes the right to vote in Democratic Party primary elections in Texas held violative of
fourteenth amendment); see also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77 (1917).
1. 47 Stat. 337 (1932). 18 U.S.C. 1548 (1946).
2. State v. District Court, 125 Mont. 398, 239 P.2d 272 (1951).
3. United States v. Jacobs, 113 F.Supp. 203 (E.D. Wis. 1953).
4. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542 (1909); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886); cf. Earle v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361, 44 N.W. 254 (1890).
